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COMMENT
FETAL PROTECTION AND UAW v. JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC.:
JOB OPENINGS FOR BARREN WOMEN ONLY
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, increasing numbers of industrial chemicals have been
identified as hazardous to workers' reproductive systems.1 Employers
have responded to this risk by implementing fetal protection policies that
exclude fertile women2 from toxic workplaces.3 Three federal appellate
courts4 have attempted to resolve the resulting conflict between a wo-
man's right to be free from employment discrimination' and the em-
ployer's desire to exclude her from employment that may injure the fetus.
In the most recent case, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,6 several unions
and employees (the "UAW") brought an action under Title VII of the
1. These chemicals are classified according to their effects on human reproductive
systems. See Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for the Em-
ployment Rights of Women, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 802-06 (1981); Note, Exclusionary
Employment Practices in Hazardous Industries: Protection or Discrimination?, 5 Colum.
J. Envtl. L. 97, 99-100 (1978).
Several commentators have discussed the issue of reproductive hazards in the work-
place. See Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1219 (1986); Finley, The Exclusion of Fertile Women from the Hazardous Work-
place: The Latest Example of Discriminatory Protective Policies, or a Legitimate, Neutral
Response to an Emerging Social Problem?, in Proceedings of N.Y.U." Thirty-eighth Ann.
Nat'l Conf. on Labor § 16-1 (1985); Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work
Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 63 (1980); Howard, supra; Williams, Firing the Wo-
man to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Oppor-
tunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 Geo. L.J. 641 (1981); Note, supra.
2. Fertile women are defined as all women who cannot establish their sterility. See
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 876 n.8 (7th Cir.
1989) (en bane), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1990) (No. 89-1215); see
also Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1182 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[a]ny woman age 5
through 63 is assumed to be fertile").
3. Companies excluding women from positions involving exposure to toxic chemi-
cals include: American Cyanamid Co., B.F. Goodrich Co., Dow Chemical Co., Environ-
mental I Protection & Aeration Systems, Inc., Firestone, General Motors Corp.,
Monsanto, Johnson Controls, Inc., Olin Corp. and St. Joe Minerals Corp. See Howard,
supra note 1, at 798 n.3; Williams, supra note 1, at 642 n. 11.
The toxic chemicals for which companies have instituted such policies include benzene,
carbon monoxide, lead, mercury and vinyl chloride. See Williams, supra note 1, at 647-
48.
4. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp.,
726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982);
infra notes 66-89 and accompanying text.
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of color, national origin, race, religion and sex.
See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
6. 680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert..
granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 challenging Johnson Controls' ("Johnson") fe-
tal protection policy, which barred all fertile women from jobs involving
exposure to lead.7 The district court granted Johnson's motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that the policy did not violate Title VIIY
Affirming the district court's judgment,9 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit characterized Johnson's policy as facially neutral, but
recognized that it had a disproportionate discriminatory impact on wo-
men. The court thus departed from Title VII's plain language, which
would have required that the policy be treated as a case of disparate
treatment discrimination justifiable only under the statute's "bona fide
occupational qualification" (the "BFOQ"). 10 Instead, the Seventh Cir-
cuit found the policy to be an instance of disparate impact discrimination
that could be justified under the broader business necessity standard.11
This finding is clearly troubling for two reasons. Functionally, the
opinion is worrisome because by allowing such a broad justification of
sex-specific fetal protection policies, the Seventh Circuit essentially per-
mits employers to decide what is in the best interest of their employees,
rather than ensure that such decisions remain in the employees' domain.
Furthermore, the decision opens the door to judicial undercutting of Ti-
tle VII's protections, by permitting courts to reach a desired result while
paying only lip service to the statute's underlying policies.
This Comment argues that, in view of Title VII's language, its legisla-
tive history and developed case law, the Seventh Circuit should have
found that Johnson's fetal protection policy involved disparate treatment
discrimination unjustifiable under Title VII's BFOQ exception. Part I of
this Comment examines why Title VII's legislative history and case law
dictate a finding of disparate treatment discrimination. Part II criticizes
the Johnson decision and argues that the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits,
upon which Johnson relied, erred in making similar findings in analogous
cases. Part II also contends that, even assuming the case was properly
characterized as one of disparate impact, the Seventh Circuit was incor-
rect in affirming summary judgment. This Comment concludes that all
sex-specific fetal protection policies are unjustifiable under Title VII be-
cause they fail to meet the BFOQ's strict standard.
7. See id. at 310. Johnson is engaged in the manufacture of batteries, which entails
the use of lead. Its policy bars all fertile women from jobs in which there was a likelihood
that the level of lead in their blood would exceed 30 micrograms per deciliter. See id.
8. See id.
9. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 901 (7th Cir.
1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
10. See infra notes 27-39 & 119-127 and accompanying text.
11. See Johnson, 886 F.2d at 888-93; infra notes 55-65 & 90-114 and accompanying
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I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CASE LAW INTERPRETATION
A. Title VII's Prohibition of Sex Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gives sex a protected status
that prevents its consideration in employment decisions.12 The provi-
sion's legislative history is meager and gives little indication of Con-
gress's intent.13 The inclusion of sex in the statute without limiting
language, 14 however, suggests that Congress intended to afford Title VII
protection against sex discrimination equal to the protection granted to
the other prohibited classifications.
B. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
Title VII's definition of "discrimination on the basis of sex" was
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (the "P.D.A.")
to include discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions." 15 Employers were thereby prohibited from
considering a woman's pregnancy or pregnancy-related condition when
making employment decisions. The P.D.A. further requires that women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions must be
regarded only in light of their ability to perform the duties of the job in
question.16
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
13. See Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualifi-
cation, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1025, 1027 (1977) (citing Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384
F. Supp. 141, 144 n.4 (E.D. Mich. 1974)).
The sex classification was proposed on the last day of House debate by Representative
Smith of Virginia, a staunch opponent of the Civil Rights Bill. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2577-
84 (1964); see also Bujel, 384 F. Supp. at 144 n.4 ("The original proponent of the measure
was a southern Congressman who voted against the Act, and whose strategy was alleg-
edly to 'clutter up' Title VII so that it would never pass at all.").
14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)k (1982).
After Title VII's enactment, but before the P.D.A., the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission ("EEOC"), the government agency charged with implementing Title
VII, issued guidelines stating that exclusion of applicants or employees from employment
because of pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth (or recovery therefrom) violates
Title VII. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1975); Prohibition of Sex Discrimination Based on
Pregnancy, H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4749, 4750 [hereinafter House Report].
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). The P.D.A. provides that:
1990]
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Congress amended Title VII with the P.D.A. in response to two
Supreme Court decisions 7 that refused to follow EEOC guidelines"8 and
confused the analysis of pregnancy-related discrimination.19 Recogniz-
ing that these decisions failed to provide guidance as to what analytical
framework would apply in a given situation,20 Congress passed the
[t]he terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis ofpregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes... as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
Id. (emphasis added).
17. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
In Gilbert, the Supreme Court relied on its decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974), an equal protection challenge to a disability benefits policy, and held that an
employer's decision not to provide costly disability benefits for pregnancy-related condi-
tions was not sex discrimination. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135-36. The Court reasoned
that because women belonged to both the "pregnant" and "non-pregnant" categories,
they were not discriminated against as a group. See id. at 135 (quoting Geduldig, 417
U.S. at 496-97, n.20). The Court concluded that because women were denied a benefit
that men could not possibly receive, there was no sex discrimination. See id. (citing
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97). Such reasoning was particularly suspect because the em-
ployer's program provided benefits for disabilities unique to the male reproductive system
(such as vasectomies). See id. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
After concluding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimina-
tion on its face, the Supreme Court applied a disparate impact analysis and queried
whether the disability benefits program had a disproportionate adverse impact on women.
See id. at 136-37. The Court found no such impact and, therefore, no discrimination. See
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136-37.
In Satty, the Supreme Court held that a policy that deprived women of accumulated
seniority because of their absence from work for childbirth did have a disparate impact
on women and therefore violated Title VII. See Satty, 434 U.S. at 13843. The Court
distinguished Satty from Gilbert by drawing a distinction between benefits and burdens.
In Gilbert there was no discrimination because the employer had "merely refused to ex-
tend to women a benefit that men cannot... receive." Id. at 142. The employer in Satty,
however, violated Title VII because it went further than merely denying women a benefit
by "impos[ing] on [them] a substantial burden that men need not suffer." Id.
18. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
In disagreeing with the Gilbert majority's finding that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy was not sex discrimination, Congress expressly referred to Justice Brennan's
dissent, which supported the EEOC guidelines as a reasonable interpretation and imple-
mentation of Title VII's broad social objectives, see House Report, supra note 15, at 4750,
and to Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion that "it is the capacity to become pregnant
which primarily differentiates the female from the male." Id. (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S.
at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Indeed, Congress stated that "the dissenting Justices
correctly interpreted the Act" as a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy. See id.
19. See House Report, supra note 15, at 4750-51.
20. In particular, the Satty Court failed to explain why the "burden" approach was
not applicable in Gilbert, "where only women were burdened with paying their living
expenses out of their own savings" during the time they were disabled due to childbirth.
See House Report, supra note 15, at 4751 (emphasis added). Nor did the Satty court
explain why "the right to retain one's seniority while absent from work" could not be
considered a benefit. Id. This lack ofjudicial guidance "left both employers and employ-
ees in the untenable position of guessing ... whether the courts would apply the 'benefits'
or the 'burdens' label to a particular policy." Id.
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P.D.A. to clarify the scope of its intended prohibition against sex dis-
crimination. The P.D.A., therefore, was enacted to "mak[e] clear that
distinctions based on pregnancy are per se violations of Title VII,... and
[to] obviate the difficulties in applying the distinctions created" by the
Supreme Court.21
Congress acknowledged that women were discriminated against be-
cause of the assumption that they will become pregnant and leave the
workforce.2 2 To prohibit decisions based on such assumptions, Congress
indicated that "related medical conditions" include any physiological
conditions related to childbearing and unique to women.23 It stressed
that the P.D.A. requires employers to consider pregnant women not on
the basis of their pregnant condition, but on the basis of how that condi-
tion affects their job performance.24
The legislative history further suggests that the P.D.A. may ban sex-
specific fetal protection policies. At hearings in both houses, the Cham-
ber of Commerce of the United States submitted written statements op-
posing the P.D.A. because it "would prevent an employer from refusing
certain work to a pregnant employee where such work arguably posed a
threat to the health of either the mother-to-be or her unborn child."'25
The passage of the P.D.A. despite these statements indicates that Con-
21. See id.
Congress also indicated that the P.D.A. "would eliminate the need in most instances to
rely on the impact approach." Id.; infra notes 55-65 & 90-114 and accompanying text.
22. See 123 Cong. Rec. 29,385 (1977); House Report, supra note 15, at 4751; Amend-
ing Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, S. Rep. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977)
[hereinafter Senate Report].
23. See Senate Report, supra note 22, at 3-4; House Report, supra note 15, at 4753.
24. See House Report, supra note 15, at 4751-54. The report stated that
[the bill] specifically defines standards which require that pregnant workers be
treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to
work.... The bill would simply require that pregnant women be treated the
same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work.
The 'same treatment' may include [various] practices... so long as the re-
quirements and benefits are administered equally for all workers in terms of
their actual ability to perform work.... In addition to... benefit programs,
other employment policies which adversely affect pregnant workers are also
covered. These policies include: refusal to hire or promote pregnant women;
termination of pregnant women; mandatory leave for pregnant women arbitrar-
ily established at a certain time during their pregnancy and not based on their
inability to work.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Senate Report, supra note 22, at 4 (treatment of pregnant
women must focus on actual effects of pregnancy on ability to work).
25. Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977 Hearings on S. 995 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 482
(1977) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]; Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the
Basis of Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings on H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on
Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 84, 88 (1977).
At the Senate hearings, an expert medical witness, responding to whether he thought
that the P.D.A. would raise any safety and health issues, stated:
I have long been an advocate for a massive increase in research to deal with the
1990]
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gress recognized that the.P.D.A. could prohibit sex-specific fetal protec-
tion policies.26
C. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification of Title VII
Title VII provides an exception to its general prohibition of sex dis-
crimination in employment, tolerating such discrimination where sex is a
"bona fide occupational qualification" for the job in question.2 7 The leg-
islative history of Title VII, however, provides little guidance as to what
constitutes a BFOQ.
The debates in the House of Representatives were sparse.28 The provi-
sion's proponent referred to the "many instances" where sex was a
BFOQ, but provided only the example of an "elderly woman who wants
a female nurse."29 Such a broad reference implies that the BFOQ would
effects of poisons, chemicals, physical or other agents on pregnant working wo-
men....
But you never dream of thinking that the same agents may also affect the
testicles of men. So if we are talking about untoward effects of industrial
processes on human procreation, we have to look at the effects on testicles, the
effects on ovaries and the effects on the fetuses ....
Senate Hearings, supra, at 67 (emphasis added).
26. See Becker, supra note 1, at 1255-56. The P.D.A.'s legislative history also indi-
cates that Congress intended to protect women against pregnancy-related discrimination,
even if doing so resulted in substantially increased costs to employers. See House Report,
supra note 15, at 4757-58; infra note 114.
Congress recognized that the P.D.A.'s passage would increase employer costs in two
areas: disability benefits and health insurance. The estimated cost increase to employers
for disability benefits ranged from $130 million per year to $571 million per year. See id.
Congress found the Department of Labor's figure of $191.5 million per year to be the
most reliable. See id.
The increased costs to employers for health insurance could not be reliably estimated
due to lack of sufficient data, widely varying hospital and delivery costs throughout the
United States, and health plans' varying treatment of pregnancy and related conditions.
See id. Congress passed the P.D.A. despite the fact that the actual costs to employers
might greatly exceed $191.5 million per year due to these indeterminable health insur-
ance costs.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1988). The BFOQ provision of Title VII provides that:
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bonafide occu-
pational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that par-
ticular business or enterprise ....
Id. (emphasis added).
28. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
29. 110 Cong. Rec. 2718 (1964); see also Sirota, supra note 13, at 1059-71 (discussing
five job categories for which sex has been deemed a BFOQ: jobs requiring authenticity or
genuineness, privacy, sex appeal, psychosexual requirements, or prison security).
The EEOC interpreted the provision narrowly. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1988). Ac-
cording to the EEOC's guidelines, sex is not a BFOQ if the discrimination is based on
stereotypical characteristics, co-worker, customer or employer preferences, or state em-
ployment legislation. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.2(a)(1)(i)-(iii), 1604.2(b) (1988). The guide-
lines expressly allow sex as a BFOQ only in cases involving "authenticity," such as the
employment of an actress for a woman's role. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1988).
Addressing the impact of Title VII and the P.D.A. on fetal protection policies, the
[Vol. 58
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serve as only a modest check on sex discrimination.
The House debates, however, suggested a narrower interpretation by
indicating what the BFOQ was not intended to encompass. 30 An amend-
ment proposed by Representative Dowdy would have permitted sex dis-
crimination if there were other non-prohibited reasons for the
employment decision. 31 The House's defeat of Dowdy's amendment in-
dicates that Title VII requires that sex be completely excluded as a factor
in employment decisions. A decision motivated partially by sex is as im-
permissible as one based solely on sex.32
The Senate provided a clearer picture of its intended interpretation of
the BFOQ provision.33 The Senate intended to prohibit employers from
making sex-based employment decisions on the basis of subjective stan-
dards, such as business judgment.34 Maintenance of business goodwill
was also considered a prohibited reason for making sex-based employ-
ment decisions, 35 as were employment decisions based wholly or partially
EEOC issued a Policy Statement that interpreted Title VII's prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy to include discrimination on the basis of a women's fertility.
See EEOC: Policy Statement on Reproductive and Fetal Hazards Under Title VII, Fair
Empl. Pracs. Man. (BNA) 405:6613, at 6614 (Oct. 3, 1988) [hereinafter EEOC: Policy
Statement]. The EEOC stated that employers may not treat "a female employee...
differently from male employees because of her pregnancy or capacity to become preg-
nant." Id. (emphasis added). The EEOC further indicated that policies expressly barring
women from jobs because of fertility are facially discriminatory. See id.
30. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2726-28 (1964).
31. See id.
32. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1785-86 (1989) (employer may
avoid liability for decision based on legitimate and illegitimate motives, by showing by
preponderance of evidence that same decision would have resulted absent illegitimate
motive); cf. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977) (employer may avoid liability for dismissing teacher for exercising first amend-
ment rights, by proving by preponderance of evidence that it would have reached same
decision absent protected conduct).
33. See 110 Cong. Rec. 7212-13 (1964). The Senate floor managers of the Civil
Rights Bill issued an Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII stating that the BFOQ
provided a "limited right to discriminate" and that it "must not be confused with [the
employer's right] to hire and fire on the basis of general qualifications for the job, such as
skill or intelligence." Id. at 7213.
Like the House, the Senate rejected several proposed amendments to the Bill, implicitly
narrowing the BFOQ's interpretation. Senator McClellan proposed an amendment that
would have permitted employers to discriminate on the basis of sex if the goodwill of the
business would be adversely affected. See 110 Cong. Rec. 13,825 (1964). Senator Mc-
Clellan's purpose for the proposed amendment was to allow employers to make employ-
ment decisions based on business judgment. See id. One commentator has noted that the
Senate's rejection of Senator McClellan's amendment implies that "customer attitudes
and preferences, the major component[s] of goodwill," cannot be considered by employ-
ers when making employment decisions. Sirota, supra note 13, at 1030.
Senator McClellan also reintroduced the Dowdy amendment, which would have per-
mitted sex discrimination if sex was not the sole basis for the employment decision. See
110 Cong. Rec. 13,837 (1964). This amendment met defeat in the Senate, as it had in the
House. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2726-28, 13,837-38 (1964).
34. See 110 Cong. Rec. 7212-13 (1964).
35. See id. at 13,825.
1990]
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on sex.36
The language and legislative history of Title VII and the P.D.A.
clearly indicate that Congress intended to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sex37 and to afford similar protection to pregnant women by in-
cluding discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or capacity to become
pregnant under the definition of sex discrimination. 38 The history and
language of the provision also indicate that Congress intended to provide
a narrow exception to the prohibition in those instances where sex is a
BFOQ for the job in question. 39 Thus, a fetal protection policy that pur-
sues its goal by excluding all fertile women from the workplace, regard-
less of their ability to perform, undermines Congress's intent to afford all
women protection from discriminatory treatment.
D. Case Law Interpretation of Title VII
The Supreme Court has recognized Congress's intent that Title VII
prohibit not only cases of disparate treatment, but also cases involving
disparate impact.' Under the disparate treatment theory of discrimina-
tion, an employer violates Title VII by intentionally and overtly41 dis-
36. See id. at 13,837.
37. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
Arguably, the P.D.A. might be read as inapplicable to fertile women because its lan-
guage does not expressly mention fertility: it refers only to pregnancy, childbirth and
related medical conditions. This interpretation would produce the anomalous result of
expressly protecting pregnant-fertile women, while leaving nonpregnant-fertile women to
seek protection under the more easily defensible disparate impact analysis. See infra
notes 55-65 & 90-114 and accompanying text. Indeed, it seems illogical to prevent em-
ployers from discriminating against women on the basis of sex (Title VII) and to include
in the the definition of sex the characteristics of pregnancy, childbirth and related medical
conditions (P.D.A.), but still allow exclusion of fertile women.
40. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-27
(1975) (applying Griggs analysis).
41. See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
An employer might also covertly discriminate against members of a protected class.
Under this theory, an employer violates Title VII by discriminating intentionally, but
covertly, against a protected class by implementing a facially neutral policy designed to
treat that class less favorably. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
800-01 (1973). Such covert disparate treatment is allegedly based on a non-prohibited
reason that is merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. See id. at 801.
Proof of discriminatory intent is therefore essential to establish a prima facie case of
covert discrimination. See id. at 801-02. The burden on the employee here is more diffi-
cult to meet than in cases of overt discrimination because the policy is facially neutral.
The McDonnell Court indicated that plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing
that (a) he belonged to a protected class; (b) he was qualified for and applied for an open
position; (c) he was rejected despite his qualifications; and (d) the employer continued
interviewing similarly qualified applicants. See id. at 802.
The employer may rebut plaintiff's prima facie case by articulating a "legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason" for the employment decision. Id. Plaintiff can still prevail by
proving that the stated reason is merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. See id.
[Vol. 58
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criminating against a member of a protected class.4' Discriminatory
intent43 can be inferred from the existence of the employer's overtly dis-
criminatory policy.' The employer may nonetheless avoid liability for
such a policy by justifying it under the statutorily sanctioned BFOQ.45
The courts' various tests for the BFOQ justification have all been nar-
rowly formulated.46 In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co.,' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, holding that the em-
ployer's exclusion of women from telephone switchman positions was not
justified under the BFOQ, articulated the "all or substantially all" test
for a BFOQ analysis. Under this test, an employer may justify his dis-
crimination by "proving that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a
factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved."4"
In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,"9 the Fifth Circuit held
that Pan Am's hiring of only female flight attendants violated Title VII
because sex was not a BFOQ for the position.50 Diaz introduced an "es-
sence" test, stating that "discrimination based on sex is valid only when
the essence of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring
members of one sex exclusively."'"
at 802-03. This burden is met by a showing "that other tests or selection devices, without
a similarly undesirable [discriminatory] effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate
interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.'" Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (citing
McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 801). The McDonnell Court justified its analytical framework by
noting that, absent such proof of pretext, the employer's policy could not be considered
"the kind of 'artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barrierl] to employment'" that Con-
gress intended to remove. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 806 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).
42. See, eg., Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1081 (1983) (pay-
ment of higher pension benefits to men than to similarly situated women constitutes facial
discrimination); City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (practice of
deducting greater pension contributions from female employees' paychecks than from
males' paychecks constitutes facial discrimination).
43. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2784 (1988); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
44. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; Williams, supra note 1, at 669 n.176.
45. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
47. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
48. Id. at 235 (emphasis added). In Weeks, the employer argued that its refusal to
promote a woman into a switchman's position came within the BFOQ because the job
entailed "strenuous" lifting of heavy objects. See id. at 234. The court disagreed, holding
that this discrimination was based on stereotypes and not on the individual woman's
abilities and that the employer had failed to prove that all or substantially all women
would be incapable of performing thejob. See id. at 234-36; cf. Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422 (1985) (articulating same test for BFOQ justification in action
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
49. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
50. See id. at 389.
51. Id. at 388.
In Diaz, Pan Am admitted that its policy of restricting the position of flight cabin
attendant to women discriminated against men, but attempted to justify its decision by
arguing that being a woman was a BFOQ because Pan Am's customers overwhelmingly
preferred women attendants. See id. at 387. The court held that Pan Am failed to estab-
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The Ninth Circuit, in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.,52 espoused a
"sexual characteristics" test in rejecting an employer's policy excluding
women from jobs requiring strenuous physical activity. Addressing its
concern that such policies were based on stereotypical standards and not
on an individual woman's ability,53 the Ninth Circuit required a link be-
tween sexual characteristics and the ability to perform the duties in
question.54
All the tests for the BFOQ justification share a common theme: to
prevail, an employer must establish a nexus between sex and the individ-
ual's ability to perform the duties of the position in question.
The Supreme Court first articulated the disparate impact theory of dis-
crimination in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"5 which held that an employer
violates Title VII by adopting a facially neutral policy or practice that
has a disproportionate adverse impact on a protected class.5 6 Unlike dis-
parate treatment discrimination, the plaintiff need not prove discrimina-
tory intent to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination because the consequences of the facially neutral policy
constitute the violation.57 Therefore, an employer violates Title VII even
if he innocently implements a neutral policy that results in adverse dis-
criminatory effects on a protected class.58 An employer may, however,
lish the BFOQ justification because the function of the cabin attendant's position was
tangential to the essence of Pan Am's business: transporting passengers safely from one
point to another. See id. at 388. But see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334-35
(1977) (BFOQ established where Alabama hired only male correctional counselors for
male maximum-security prisons housing sex offenders because ability to keep order was
"essen[tial] [to] a correctional counselor's job" and to maintain security).
52. 444 F.2d 12 19 (9th Cir. 1971).
53. See id. at 1225. The court stated that "sexual characteristics, rather than charac-
teristics that might, to one degree or another, correlate with a particular sex, must be the
basis for the application of the BFOQ exception." Id. (emphasis added).
54. See id. at 1224. The court stated that the sexual characteristics must be as "cru-
cial to the successful performance of the job, as they would be for the position of a wet-
nurse." Id. (emphasis added).
55. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
56. See id. at 431.
In Griggs, the employer's intelligence tests, while not intended to be discriminatory,
disproportionately excluded blacks from jobs. The Court found that Title VII prohibits
such disparate impact discrimination, stating that "[t]he Act proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair inform, but discriminatory in operation."
Id. (emphasis added).
57. See id. at 430-32.
The Court noted that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 432; see also Dothard v. Rawl-
inson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-30 (1977) (prima facie case established where employer's facially
neutral height and weight requirements resulted in exclusion of disproportionate number
of women). But see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2124 (1989)
(requiring that plaintiff establish prima facie case by identifying specific employment
practice being challenged and showing it to be cause of statistical disparity under attack);
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2788 (1988) (same).
58. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination under this theory by
showing that the neutral policy operates to disproportionately exclude members of a pro-
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avoid liability by producing evidence that the discrimination was justified
under the business necessity defense,59 which requires that the em-
ployer's practice be related to the position in question.' °
This defense, which was initially applied almost as narrowly as the
BFOQ,61 has recently been expanded.62 Originally, the defense required
that the disparately impacting policy be "necessary to the safe and effi-
cient operation of the business."63 Today, an employer can prevail by
establishing that the policy significantly serves "legitimate employment
goals."" Even under this expanded interpretation, however, an em-
tected class. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
The Supreme Court developed the disparate impact theory to circumvent the typically
heavy evidentiary burdens plaintiffs encountered in establishing discriminatory intent.
Congress's objective in enacting Title VII was "to achieve equality of employment oppor-
tunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other[s]." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30 (emphasis added).
The Court has since retreated from this position, and has placed additional burdens on
plaintiff. See, eg., Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (shifting burden of persuasion from
defendant to plaintiff on issue of whether business necessity exists); Watson, 108 S. Ct. at
2790 (plaintiff has burden of showing that specific employment practice challenged
caused disparate impact).
59. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971); see also Wards Cove,
109 S. Ct. at 2126 (employer has burden of production on issue of whether business
necessity defense exists; burden of persuasion is on plaintiff).
60. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. The Court stated that:
The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates
to exclude [a protected class] cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited....
Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.
Id. at 431-32 (emphasis added). Specifically, the Court held that to be justified as a busi-
ness necessity, the employer's intelligence test must be "demonstrably a reasonable mea-
sure of job performance." Id. at 436. But see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.
Ct. 2115, 2125-26 (1989) (dictum) (requiring that challenged policy significantly serve
"the legitimate employment goals of the employer").
61. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977) (business necessity
not established where employer's practice insufficiently related to essence of job under
disparate impact analysis); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)
(business necessity not established where employer's testing requirements not manifestly
related to job in question); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-36 (employment practice excluding
blacks was not related to job performance).
62. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125-26 (1989)
(dictum) (business necessity established where employer's disparately impacting policy
significantly serves employer's legitimate employment goals); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2790 (1988) (dictum) (business necessity established if
employer could show that subjective hiring criteria were "based on legitimate business
reasons," unless employee could show existence of less discriminatory but equally effec-
tive alternatives); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.31
(1979) (business necessity established where employer's no-methadone policy signifi-
cantly served legitimate safety and efficiency goals).
63. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971) (emphasis
added); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (policy should bear
"manifest relationship" to job in question).
64. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125; see also Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790 (prima facie
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ployer's desire to protect fetuses from harm by excluding women from
certain jobs may violate Title VII, because a policy that fails to consider
the individual woman's ability to perform the employment in question
cannot be said to serve legitimate employment goals."
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S QUESTIONABLE HOLDING
A. Disparate Impact vs. Disparate Treatment
UAW challenged Johnson's fetal protection policy barring fertile wo-
men from any jobs in which there was a likelihood that the level of lead
in the blood of workers would exceed 30 micrograms per deciliter. 6
Johnson's policy also barred fertile women from any jobs that, through
promotion, would ultimately lead to lead exposure jobs.67 Affirming the
district court's grant of summary judgment,68 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit found the policy valid under Title VII. 69
The Seventh Circuit was persuaded by the approaches taken by the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits in analyzing similar cases, and by the
EEOC's Policy Statement regarding fetal protection policies.7" These
sources indicated that fetal protection policies could not be justified
under the statutory BFOQ analysis.7" Consequently, the courts improp-
erly reclassified the policies as cases of disparate impact, allowing appli-
cation of the broader business necessity defense.7'
case rebuttable where employer's subjective hiring criteria are "based on legitimate busi-
ness reasons").
65. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
66. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 310
(E.D. Wis. 1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct.
1522 (1990).
67. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 919 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Fasterbrook, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
68. See Johnson, 680 F. Supp. at 310.
.69. See Johnson, 886 F.2d at 901.
70. See id. at 883-87; see also Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552-
53 (11th Cir. 1984) (in holding employer's policy unjustified, court articulated rule that
business necessity defense, normally available only in cases of facially neutral policies,
may be used to justify facially discriminatory fetal protection policy); Wright v. Olin
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1192 (4th Cir. 1982) (fetal protection policy analyzed and upheld
under disparate impact theory); EEOC: Policy Statement, supra note 29, Fair Empl.
Pracs. Man. (BNA) at 405:6613 n.1 (outlining analytical framework developed by Hayes
and Wright courts).
71. See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547-49; Wright, 697 F.2d at 1185 n.21; EEOC: Policy
Statement, supra note 29, Fair Empl. Pracs. Man. (BNA) at 405:6614-15 & n.10.
72. See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548; Wight, 697 F.2d at 1186; infra notes 73-89 and
accompanying text.
Title VII states that discrimination on the basis of sex is not unlawful if sex is a BFOQ
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of the business involved. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e)1 (1982) (emphasis added). Both the Hayes and Wright courts misquoted the
BFOQ provision by omitting the word "reasonably." See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1549;
Wright, 697 F.2d at 1185 n.21. By misreading the statute, those courts carved out a
narrower exception for the BFOQ than Congress intended. See supra notes 27-39 and
accompanying text. Faced with a seemingly insurmountable standard, the courts may
have found it necessary to engage in judicial gymnastics in order to apply the less formi-
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The Seventh Circuit determined that Johnson's policy of barring all
fertile women from lead exposure jobs was facially neutral, presenting a
more easily defensible case of disparate impact, because the policy "effec-
tively and equally protects the offspring of all employees."7 Although
Johnson's policy expressly excluded fertile women,74 the court justified
its finding of disparate impact by indicating that the business necessity
defense "balance[s] the interests of the employer, the employee and the
unborn child in a manner consistent with Title VII.""
This cart-before-the-horse argument is reminiscent of the Fourth Cir-
cuit's analysis in Wright v. Olin Corp., a Title VII challenge to a similar
fetal protection policy. In Wright, the Fourth Circuit justified its rejec-
tion of the disparate treatment/BFOQ analysis by holding that such an
analysis would have precluded the employer from attempting a business
necessity defense.77 In other words, because the employer could not win
under a disparate treatment/BFOQ analysis, the case was characterized
as one of disparate impact, thus affording the employer the broader busi-
ness necessity defense.7" This misapplication of case law7 9 created a new
defense to facial discrimination on the basis of sex and pregnancy based
on present need but devoid of statutory basis.
The Seventh Circuit also relied on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital,0 a Title VII challenge to employer's
dismissal of a pregnant X-ray technician. Hayes, like Wright, overcame
dable business necessity defense. Had they correctly read the statute, however, they
might have analyzed the policies under the disparate treatment rubric and applied the
BFOQ. As Judge Posner noted in his dissent, the language of the BFOQ "is not so
cramped that it has to be stretched" to justify a fetal protection policy. International
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 903 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), cert granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
73. See Johnson, 886 F.2d at 885 (quoting Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548) (emphasis ad-
ded). The court so held because fetal protection policies involve "motivations and conse-
quences most closely resembling a disparate impact case." Id. at 884. The court
recognized, however, that the "facial neutrality of a fetal protection policy 'might be
subject to logical dispute.'" Id. at 884 (quoting Wright, 697 F.2d at 1186).
74. See id. at 876 n.8.
75. Id. at 886. The majority's concern with weighing the interests of the fetus under
Title VII is questionable because the statute nowhere addresses fetal interests. See supra
note 12; see also Johnson, 886 F.2d at 913 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("Risk to fetuses
falls outside these rules.").
The majority most likely believed that social policies outside of Title VII warrant an
exception to the statute's normal approach. See Johnson, 886 F.2d at 884-86 (agreeing
with EEOC that business necessity defense applies to this "narrow class" of cases). The
EEOC implicitly recognized that extra-Title VII policies are involved when it states that
fetal protection cases "must be regarded as a class unto themselves" because they fail to
"fit neatly into the traditional Title VII analytical framework." See EEOC. Policy State-
ment, supra note 29, Fair Empl. Pracs. Man. (BNA) at 405:6615 n.ll.
76. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
77. See id. at 1185 & n.21.
78. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 910 (Eas-
terbrook, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
79. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
80. 726 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
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the facial discrimination hurdle through imaginative analysis."1 The
Eleventh Circuit initially found that a fetal protection policy could
"never be neutral," and therefore could only be justified by a BFOQ. 2
It elaborated, however, that such a policy presented only a presumption
of disparate treatment, rebuttable by a showing that "although [the] pol-
icy applies only to women, [it] is neutral in the sense that it effectively
and equally protects the offspring of all employees." 83 The employer
could meet this burden by establishing the elements of a business neces-
sity defense.8 4 By allowing an employer to justify a case of disparate
treatment discrimination under a business necessity defense, normally
applicable only in disparate impact cases, the Eleventh Circuit, like the
Fourth Circuit, created a new defense lacking statutory basis and rooted
in contorted reasoning."
81. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
82. See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547-48.
83. Id. at 1548.
84. See id. The Hayes court held that the employer could rebut the presumption by
proving that "there is a substantial risk of harm to the fetus or potential offspring" and
that "the hazard applies to fertile or pregnant women, but not to men." Id. After suc-
cessfully rebutting the presumption of facial discrimination, the employer would no
longer be required to provide a BFOQ justification, and a disparate impact/business ne-
cessity analysis would apply automatically "because to reach the disparate impact stage
of analysis in a fetal protection case, the employer has already proved-to overcome the
presumption of facial discrimination-that its policy is justified." Id. at 1553.
85. See supra notes 12-39 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that any employment decisions made on the
basis of sex constitute disparate treatment and can be justified only under a BFOQ analy-
sis. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), an early Title VII sex
discrimination case decided before the P.D.A., the Court found that the employer's re-
fusal to hire women with pre-school age children violated Title VII. The employer's
practice was arguably neutral with respect to sex in that it might have benefitted the
offspring of both sexes. Nonetheless, the Court held the practice to be disparate treat-
ment discrimination justifiable only under the BFOQ. See id. at 544; see also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977) (policy that particular jobs are "too dangerous for
women [violates]... the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make that
choice for herself"); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971)
(employer's policy based on subjective assumption that women are weaker than men vio-
lated Title VII because employee was "denied an opportunity to demonstrate personal
physical qualification" for job); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388
(5th Cir.) (policy barring men from flight attendant positions violated Title VII because it
failed to "take into consideration the ability of individuals to perform... the job"), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236
(5th Cir. 1969) (practice of barring women from "strenuous" lifting jobs divests individ-
ual women of power to decide for themselves whether to accept such jobs).
In two post-P.D.A. cases, City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), and
Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983), the Supreme Court held that
any distinctions between men and women, no matter how reasonable, are per se disparate
treatment discrimination on the basis of sex and violate Title VII. In Manhart, the em-
ployers' policies required women to contribute more to pension plans than men, yet dis-
bursed equal payments to both men and women after retirement. See Manhart, 435 U.S.
at 704, 708-09. Similarly, the policies in Norris disbursed smaller retirement benefits to
women who had contributed on an equal basis with men. See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1074.
The Court held that Title VII prohibited employers from distinguishing between men
and women for pension purposes, even though the distinctions were based on a difference
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Under developed Title VII case law, however, the correct and more
principled approach is to first determine whether the policy is discrimina-
tory on its face.86 The answer to this threshold question determines
which defense will apply. If the policy is facially discriminatory, the
court must apply a BFOQ analysis.87 If the policy is facially neutral and
has a disparate impact, a business necessity defense applies.88 Only after
these initial characterizations should "balancing of the interests"8 9 issues
arise. A sex-specific fetal protection policy, then, which facially discrimi-
nates against members of one sex, constitutes disparate treatment dis-
crimination justifiable only under a BFOQ analysis.
B. Johnson's Business Necessity Defense of Fetal Protection Policies
After deciding that Johnson's policy involved disparate impact dis-
crimination, the Seventh Circuit discussed whether the policy could be
justified under a business necessity defense.90 In fetal protection cases,
in the life expectancies of men and women. See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1077 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708. The Court found the policies facially discrimina-
tory because they used sex as the criterion for decision. See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1074-75;
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708. That a policy might produce equal outcomes was irrelevant in
the Court's view because of Title VII's requirement that employees be treated as individu-
als, regardless of sex. See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1074-75; Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708.
86. See, eg., Norris, 463 U.S. at 1079-82 (Marshall, J., concurring) (policy paying
smaller retirement benefits to women than similarly situated men facially discriminates
against women); Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711 (policy requiring women to contribute more
than men to pension plan constitutes sex discrimination); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 (statu-
tory height and weight requirements for prison guard positions constituted disparate im-
pact discrimination); Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (policy excluding women with pre-school
age children constituted sex discrimination justifiable only under BFOQ); Hayes, 726
F.2d at 1547-48 (firing of pregnant X-ray technician constituted facial discrimination).
87. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Diaz, 442 F.2d at 386-87;
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232-34 (5th Cir. 1969); supra notes
47-54 and accompanying text; cf. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422-
23 (1985) (in age discrimination case, BFOQ required to justify employer's mandatory
retirement policy); Johnson v. Mayor & City Council, 472 U.S. 353, 355-56 (1985)
(same); Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 770 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1985) (in age discrimination
challenge, BFOQ required to justify policy that set maximum age for job applicants).
88. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971); supra notes 55-65 and
accompanying text.
89. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 886 (7th Cir.
1989) (en bane), cert granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
Judge Easterbrook, in his dissent, also disagreed with the court's analysis. He stated
that such an approach
makes things turn not on whether the employer uses sex as a ground of decision
but on whether the employer uses sex to serve a 'good' policy. If the policy is
beneficent and the injury to women 'tolerable' in light of the interests served,
the court changes the standard of inquiry. Yet whether a policy is 'good' is a
statutory question, governed by the BFOQ test .... A court's belief that a good
end is in view does not justify departure from the statutory framework, it is an
occasion for applying the statutory framework
Id. at 909 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
90. See Johnson, 886 F.2d at 883-87.
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this judicially created defense91 succeeds if the employer can show that
the policy avoids a substantial risk of harm to the fetus or potential fe-
tus,92 and that exposure to this risk is transmitted only through women.
93
The plaintiff can still prevail by proving that there are equally effective
but less discriminatory alternatives available.9" Applying this frame-
work, the court found Johnson's policy justified and not in violation of
Title VII. 95
The majority agreed with Johnson that the element of substantial risk
of harm referred to only one harm facing the fetus: exposure to lead.96
However, substantial risk may mean substantial net risk to the fetus;97
thus, all the effects of Johnson's policy merit consideration. Barring fer-
tile women from lead exposure jobs may actually increase the fetus's risk
of harm from dangers other than lead exposure.98 For example, denying
a woman these jobs may lessen the quality of the fetus's or infant's medi-
cal care because of the denial of the job's health insurance benefits 99
while the woman seeks other comparable employment. Moreover, the
loss of income resulting from excluding a woman from an entire class of
employment may affect the health of the fetus or infant by decreasing the
nutrition it receives. 1"° Thus, the net result of Johnson's policy might be
an overall decrease in the fetus's health. 10 ' In such a case, the substantial
91. See, ag., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (11th Cir.
1984) (business necessity defense used to rebut presumption of disparate treatment in
fetal protection case); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1189-90 (4th Cir. 1982) (busi-
ness necessity defense applied in fetal protection case); cf. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425
(business necessity defense used by employer to justify facially neutral testing policy hav-
ing discriminatory effect on blacks).
92. See Johnson, 886 F.2d at 886-90; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548; Wright, 697 F.2d at
1190-91.
93. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 886-90
(7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990); Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548;
Wight, 697 F.2d at 1190.
94. See Johnson, 886 F.2d at 886-93; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1553; Wright, 697 F.2d at
1190.
95. See Johnson, 886 F.2d at 901.
96. See id. at 889. The evidence established substantial risk of harm to the fetus. Id.
at 888.
97. See id. at 918 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 918 (pointing out "strong correlation between" infant's health and pre-
natal medical care as well as between infant's nutrition and parental income) (citing V.
Fuchs, How We Live 31-40 (1983)).
99. See Becker, supra note 1, at 1229-31.
100. See id. (citing Greenberg, Unstable Emotions of Children Tied to Poor Diet, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 18, 1981, at Cl); see also Poor Women at Higher Risk From Anemia in
Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1990, at C9, col. 3 (citing Centers for Disease Control
report indicating that "[lower-income mothers do not seem to bounce back from the
anemia common in early pregnancy as well as other women, and that increases the risk of
premature delivery and fetal death").
101. The majority believed that such incidental risks bore "no relevance to Johnson
Controls' employment practices" because women who are transferred out of jobs under
the policy retain their salary and benefits. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 889 n.28 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522
(1990). The majority ignored the fact that women excluded from these jobs are offered
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risk element would not be met and the policy, whose effects would be
contrary to its stated purpose of preventing fetal injury, would not be
justified under the defense.
In considering the second prong of the defense, the Seventh Circuit
was persuaded by testimony of Johnson's experts that a substantial risk
of harm to the potential fetus resulted from lead in the female employee's
blood stream, and that a male worker's exposure to the maximum lead
levels permitted by OSHA 10 2 did not pose a substantial risk of transmis-
sion to the potential fetus.10 3 UAW attempted to negate this element of
Johnson's defense by offering evidence, based primarily on animal stud-
ies, that such lead levels in males caused malformed sperm, thereby cre-
ating a risk of injury to potential fetuses."° Had this evidence that the
harm was communicable by both sexes persuaded the court, the defense
would have failed. 105
Even though Johnson satisfied both prongs of the business necessity
defense, UAW might have nonetheless prevailed had it been able to estab-
no equivalent protection; they never receive the salary and benefits they would have
earned in those positions. See id. at 918 n.16 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Nor did the
majority address the problem of female employees who could no longer exercise their
seniority rights to avoid layoffs because such "bumping" would place them in the prohib-
ited jobs. See id.
102. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k)(1)(i)(D) (1989) (50 micrograms per deciliter).
103. See Johnson, 886 F.2d at 889.
104. See id. at 888-89. The court was not persuaded by UAW's "attempt to bridge the
wide chasm" between animal and human studies and labelled the evidence too "specula-
tive and unconvincing" to form the basis of conclusions regarding risks. Id. at 889.
The Supreme Court, however, has found that animal studies may be used to assess
risks. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 657 n.64
(1980). Even OSHA, the agency charged with promulgating rules for workplace safety,
uses animal studies in establishing its lead control regulations. See United Steelworkers
of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1257 n.97 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S.
913 (1981).
105. Furthermore, OSHA's medical guidelines conclude that lead in men, as well as
women, creates risks to fetuses. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 Appendix C (11)(5) (1987).
The guidelines state in pertinent part that:
Exposure to lead can have serious effects on reproductive function in both males
and females. In male workers exposed to lead there can be a decrease in sexual
drive, impotence, decreased ability to produce healthy sperm, and sterility. Mal-
formed sperm (teratospermia), decreased number of sperm (hypospermia), and
sperm with decreased motility (asthenospermia) can all occur.... [B]ecause of
the... demonstrated adverse effects of lead on reproductive function in both the
male and female as well as the risk of genetic damage of lead on both the ovum
and sperm, OSHA recommends a [30 microgram per 100 gram] maximum per-
missible blood lead level in both males and females who wish to bear children.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Marshall, 647 F.2d at 1256-58 (evidence that lead harms
both sexes' reproductive systems sufficient to sustain finding that exclusion of only wo-
men from jobs was unjustified).
Additionally, an amicus brief filed by the American Public Health Association and
other health and medical groups cited numerous studies finding that lead injures the male
reproductive system which ultimately injures offspring. See International Union, UAW
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 918 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
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lish the existence of equally effective, but less restrictive alternatives to
Johnson's policy.1"6 Johnson's policy is overly-broad in at least three
respects.
First, it presumes that all women under the age of 70 are fertile, unless
they can medically prove sterility. It has been determined, however, that
the pregnancy rates in any given year are less than nine percent of all
fertile women;10 7 approximately two percent of all blue collar women
over 30 years of age;' 0.38 percent of all women 40-44 years of age;' °9
and 0.02 percent of all women 45-49 years of age. 110 Because of these
low pregnancy rates, the risk of fetal injury is slight; even in the most
favorable light, Johnson's policy unjustifiably excludes at least 91 out of
every 100 fertile women in order to prevent possible fetal injury stem-
ming from exposure to a lead environment."'
Second, such a broad policy ignores the particular circumstances of
each individual. For example, Johnson barred a fifty-year-old divorcee
with little likelihood of becoming pregnant. 112
Finally, the policy excludes presumptively fertile women from any po-
sitions from which they might be promoted into the lead exposure
jobs. 113 These initial jobs, however, pose no lead exposure risk to fetuses.
Denying women access to them, without regard to the women's qualifica-
tions, violates Title VII. 114
106. The majority found that UAW did not preserve for appeal the issue of whether
there were less restrictive alternatives available. See Johnson, 886 F.2d at 891.
107. See Williams, supra note 1, at 696.
108. See Becker, supra note 1, at 1233 & nn. 68-69 (citing United States Department of
Commerce Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1986, at 57
(1985) (1983 rates)).
109. See id.
110. See id. The Census Bureau does not list birth rates for women over 49. See id. at
1233 n.68.
111. See Williams, supra note 1, at 696. The statistics further indicate that Johnson's
policy unjustifiably excludes: approximately 98 of every 100 blue collar women over 30
years of age, see id., 4,981 of every 5,000 women 40-44 years of age and 4,999 of every
5,000 women 45-49 years of age. See Becker, supra note 1, at 1233 & nn.68-69.
112. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 919 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
113. See id. Any higher positions in the ladder of progression that are attainable only
through promotion from the lead exposure positions are necessarily blocked as well.
114. See supra notes 16, 24 & 55-65 and accompanying text.
Johnson's costs would likely increase if it initially had to train women for jobs that
promote into the lead exposure jobs and later re-train these same women for different jobs
because entry to the lead exposure jobs was barred. Cost justification, however, is not
recognized under Title VII. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,
462 U.S. 669, 685 n.26 (1983); City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17
(1978); see also Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1090-91 (1983)
(employer violated Title VII by offering pension annuities paying women lower benefits
than similarly situated men, even though estimated $85 million annual cost of correcting
discriminatory policy might prove prohibitive); House Report, supra note 15, at 4757-58
(Congress intended to protect women from pregnancy-related discrimination despite sub-
stantial costs to employers). But see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115,
2127 (1989) (cost is relevant in determining whether a less discriminatory alternative is
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The evidence presented by UAW casts substantial doubt on the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision to affirm the summary judgment.115 UAW's evi-
dence that the risk of harm to the fetus is transmitted through both
sexes 116 raised issues of fact that should have precluded a grant of sum-
mary judgment. 117 Moreover, the policy's unnecessarily broad sweep
raised issues of fact as to the existence of less restrictive alternatives.118
The Seventh Circuit should have vacated the summary judgment and
remanded the case to the district court for trial.
"equally effective as [employer's] chosen hiring procedures in achieving [employer's] le-
gitimate employment goals").
Another cost justification argument that might have been advanced by Johnson was its
wish to avoid potential tort liability for any injuries sustained by a malformed child of an
employee mother, who cannot waive the rights of her unborn or unconceived children.
Although a full discussion of the issue is beyond the scope of this Comment, general tort
principles seem to indicate that there would be no basis for holding an employer liable for
fetal injury where the employer has fully informed the female employee of the risks and
where the employer has not acted negligently. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, &
D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 18, at 112-15 (5th ed. 1984). Indeed, the em-
ployer's argument that this policy is necessary to avoid liability fails because a waiver of
negligence by the female employee would be ineffective in most jurisdictions. See id. § 68,
at 482 & n.22. Moreover, the basis of liability in these prenatal tort actions has usually
been negligence by the employer towards the mother and not towards the unborn child.
See Finley, supra note 1, § 16.04, at 16-36 to 16-37.
Even assuming that the child could establish a breach of duty by the employer, causa-
tion would prove a more difficult burden due to the lack of strong evidence tying mater-
nal occupational exposure to fetal harm. See Becker, supra note 1, at 1235 nn.77-81,
1245 (citing Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards in the
Workplace (1985)); see also Security Nat'l Bank v. Chloride, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 294, 297
(D. Kan. 1985) (in only case to date brought by child allegedly injured through parental
lead exposure caused by employer's negligence, jury returned verdict for employer despite
plaintiff's argument that employer had exceeded OSHA's maximum lead levels).
A more fundamental issue regarding whether Title VII should permit discriminatory
fetal protection policies because of employers' fear of potential tort liability is that if such
policies are allowed, the costs of injuries to the children will be borne by those children
and their mothers, not by employers. This seems contrary to Title VII's ban of sex dis-
crimination because women who are forced to carry these costs due to their capacity to
become pregnant shoulder a greater burden than men. Possible solutions more in line
with Title VII's objectives might be to engage in further efforts to remove toxins from the
workplace or to extend existing worker's compensation systems to include fetal injuries
related to parental occupational exposure to hazardous substances.
115. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) states that: "[Summary] judgment ... shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, .. . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
116. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
117. Even the EEOC questioned the district court's summary judgment in light of the
conflicting evidence. It noted that:
[T]he district court purported to apply the Hayes/Wright analysis. It con-
cluded on summary judgment that the exclusionary policy was justified, despite
the fact that ... there was conflicting evidence about harm mediated through
men. In the Commission's view, when conflicting evidence exists, summary
judgment is not appropriate.
EEOC: Policy Statement, supra note 29, Fair Empl. Pracs. Man. (BNA) at 405:6618
n.22.
118. See supra notes 106-114 and accompanying text.
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C. Johnson's BFOQ Justification of Fetal Protection Policies
The Seventh Circuit also stated in dictum that the policy would have
been justified under the BFOQ." 9 Applying the "essence" test,120 the
court stated that the BFOQ would allow Johnson's policy if Johnson
could prove that the "essence of [its] business operation would be under-
mined" by hiring fertile women. 121 The court found that such an eventu-
ality would likely occur because fertile women could not perform their
jobs "safely" without exposing their potential fetuses to a substantial risk
of harm. 122
Safety considerations as grounds for discrimination on the basis of sex
and pregnancy, however, have been allowed under the BFOQ in limited
instances in which the employee's sex or pregnancy has adversely af-
fected her ability to perform the duties of the job in question. 123 Despite
the court's broad definition of "safe,"' 24 to say that a woman's fertility
interferes with her ability to achieve the essential goal of Johnson's man-
ufacturing business stretches the BFOQ beyond reason.
The Seventh Circuit's contortion of Title VII is rendered all the more
inexcusable by the fact that there could be a fetal protection policy that
would satisfy Title VII. A valid policy would have to apply to both sexes
119. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 893-99
(7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
120. See generally Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.)
(first articulation of "essence" test), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); supra notes 49-51
and accompanying text.
121. See Johnson, 886 F.2d at 894 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333
(1977)).
122. See id. at 894-96. This conclusion hinged on the court's definition of the essence
of Johnson's business as the "manufacture [of] batteries in as safe a manner as possible"
and its expansion of the meaning of "safe" to include "protect[ing] unborn children from
a substantial risk of devastating and permanent impairment ... resulting from exposure
to a toxic industrial chemical." Id. at 896.
123. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Supreme Court permitted
Alabama to exclude women from prison guard positions at all-male penitentiaries be-
cause it found that a woman's sex would be enough to disrupt prison order. See id. at
335-36. Although it noted that Title VII allows the individual woman, and not the em-
ployer, to decide whether a particular job is too dangerous for her, the Court held sex to
be a BFOQ for the prison guard position because "[mjore [was] at stake ... than an
individual woman's decision to weigh and accept the risks of employment." Id. at 335
(emphasis added). The Court found that a woman's sex interfered with her ability to
maintain order, one of the essential duties of the prison guard job. See id. at 335-36.
Analogously, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy because of safety considerations
has been allowed when airlines dismiss pregnant stewardesses. See Harriss v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 1980); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Condit v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d 1176, 1176 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934
(1978). In these cases, the essence of the employer's business was defined as transporting
passengers safely and the pregnant condition was found to hinder stewardesses' ability to
assist passengers in emergency situations. See Harriss, 649 F.2d at 676-77; Burwell, 633
F.2d at 365-72; Condit, 558 F.2d at 1176.
124. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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equally125 and avoid drawing distinctions based on pregnancy or related
conditions. 126 The more difficult question is whether any sex-specific fe-
tal protection policy, which by its nature constitutes disparate treatment
in violation of Title VII, could be found to satisfy the narrow BFOQ.
The language of Title VII and the P.D.A., their legislative histories and
case law all indicate that the BFOQ is satisfied only where an employee's
sex adversely affects her ability to perform the essential duties of the
job. 27 Therefore, any sex-specific fetal protection policy barring women
from employment, without regard to individual ability and job perform-
ance, cannot be justified under the BFOQ.
CONCLUSION
Sex-specific fetal protection policies implemented by employers in re-
sponse to toxic workplaces that threaten the health of employees and
their offspring bar only fertile women from the workplace. Although
serving the laudable goal of protecting the next generation, such policies
ignore the clear efforts of Congress to protect women of this generation
from employment discrimination. Under Title VII, it is forbidden to
connect the policies' sex criteria to the affected jobs, without specifically
weighing an individual's capabilities. This failure proves fatal to all sex-
specific fetal protection policies.
Marcelo L. Riffaud
125. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
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